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Author’s Response
Mundari and argumentation in word-class analysis
by NICHOLAS EVANS and TOSHIKI OSADA
1. Introduction
Our three commentators raise such a host of deep and interesting issues that
we cannot hope to answer them all within the time and space at our disposal.
To begin with, we would like to thank them for pushing us to articulate the
reasons for our arguments more clearly, and for getting us to spell out a num-
ber of assumptions and intermediate argumentative steps that we did not make
sufficiently clear or explicit in our original article. We will deal with the three
commentators one by one, limiting ourselves to a few key points.
2. Peterson
We begin with Peterson’s commentary, which is the most straightforward, and
focus on two key points in his argument. He broadens the empirical base by
bringing in another Munda language, Kharia, but we believe that the essential
points of our analysis apply there as well. (We also have some disagreements
with him about the Mundari data he cites but since they are peripheral to the
main argument we do not go into them here.)
The crucial flaw in his critique of our analysis is his failure to take on board
the criterion of bidirectionality. In Section 3.3 of our original article we make
it clear that merely showing that languages are generous in what they allow to
be predicates does not demonstrate a conflation of word class distinctions: we
also need to go back and look at whether all words under discussion can be
employed in argument slots. (Recall that, as we point out in the target article,
it was a shift to this bidirectional requirement by Jacobsen, Schachter, and An-
derson that underpinned the counter-analysis to Swadesh’s monocategorialist
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view of Nootka.) Yet all of Peterson’s examples, in both Kharia and Mundari,
are limited to the question of what words are used as predicates. Without ad-
dressing the converse question, of what words can be used as arguments, his
refutation of our analysis simply falls short.
His point about the difference between phrasal and lexical categories is an
important one, and many of his Kharia examples (such as (8b)) suggest that a
wider range of morphological elements following the predicate are in fact pred-
icate enclitics rather than suffixes, positioned with respect to the last element of
what may be a phrasal predicate (such as ho rochoPb ‘this side’). Treating them
as clitics to predicate position readily allows us to explain the acceptability –
and prevalence – of a wide range of phrasal elements in predicate position.
In Section 1 of our article, we mention that “though the elements follow-
ing the verb in examples like these have generally been regarded as suffixes,
they are in fact less tightly bound to the root, phonologically, than other suf-
fixes are”. It would not be an outrageous analysis to go further and treat them
as enclitics, along the lines of Peterson’s analysis – i.e., to restrict the use of
“suffix” to what we called “close” suffixes, and call the outer suffixes “predi-
cate enclitics”. We could then analyse these clitics as attached to phrase-level
constituents, as per Peterson’s analysis, but leave “inner suffixes” (such as the
passive -o) to operate at the lexical level. And it may be an appropriate way
to deal with the very common construction type in which inchoative or stative
meanings are composed with phrases used in predicate position – and perhaps
also with the “quotative” meaning exemplified in his example (12).
However, it would be misleading to think this analysis would then account
for all examples where basically entity-denoting lexical items are used in pred-
icate slots. As we show in the section “Corollary: Compositional consistency”,
the productive semantic patterns by which nouns attract stative or inchoative
readings when used as intransitive predicates, and factitive meanings when
used in transitive predicates (e.g., ‘pancake’ > ‘make a pancake’), are not the
only types of semantic increment we find when we look over the whole lexicon.
We also find ‘use as an X’, for example (e.g., ‘scissors’ > ‘cut with scissors’).
All Peterson’s examples illustrate the primary pattern whereby predicate use
produces the inchoative, stative, or quotative readings, and we cannot com-
ment on whether Kharia is semantically more constrained than Mundari in the
range of possible semantic increments. But certainly for Mundari the sort of
treatment he proposes will not work once the full set of semantic conversion
effects needs to be accounted for.
3. Hengeveld and Rijkhoff
Hengeveld & Rijkhoff (henceforth H&R) effectively want to propose a further
way that a language could lack a noun-verb distinction, not included in our list
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of four – their “flexible” type – and want to locate Mundari within it, along
with other languages such as Samoan. They admit, though, that these types are
idealized and that Mundari has some features of their “Type 2”. This continues
the thrust of previous publications by these authors and their associates.1 We
do not find their arguments for this position convincing, for reasons we now
spell out.2
Firstly, from the outset they impose the rider “as far as its basic, non-derived
vocabulary is concerned”. An analysis of the word classes in any language
must be comprehensive, and include all lexemes, not just the non-derived
ones. We have already discussed the dangers of not requiring exhaustiveness
in Section 3.4 of our paper and need not repeat these arguments here, except to
underline that exhaustiveness is just as important in terms of covering the basic
vs. derived dimension as it is in terms of covering the full set of lexical items
in each semantic domain being surveyed.3
The heart of their objection lies in their imputation of vagueness to the se-
mantics of Mundari lexemes (Section 3.2.1). To make their analysis work, they
would need to do two things.
Firstly, they would need to succeed in stating what the putative “vague”
meaning is; without an explicit representation of this, putative vagueness anal-
yses are mere promissory notes (cf. our critique of precategorial analyses in
1. As H&R point out, we do not refer in our article to a further recent publication of theirs on
the topic, which also draws on Mundari data (Hengeveld, Rijkhoff, & Siewierska 2004). This
omission reflects the chronology of our paper, submitted to LT in 2004.
2. We will not address the issues raised in Section 5 of H&R’s article, dealing with purported
typological correlations between Mundari and other “flexible languages”. This is because we
do not regard this as a coherent notion, for reasons we spell out below, nor are we convinced
by their arguments that Mundari should be analysed as such a language.
3. H&R again discard the exhaustiveness criterion in including Samoan as not having a distinct
class of nouns (Section 1, just before example (7)), in this respect following the analysis of
Mosel & Hovdhaugen’s authoritative grammar. As their quote from Mosel & Hovdhaugen
shows, there are in fact words in Samoan that do not appear to be used in argument func-
tion (e.g., alu ‘go’) and others that do not appear to be used in predicate function (e.g., mea
‘thing’). Unlike H&R, we do not find either of Mosel & Hovdhaugen’s reasons for downplay-
ing the significance of these exceptions convincing. The first of M&H’s reasons is that “we
cannot find any functional explanation” (for these differences) – this is not a valid counter-
argument, we maintain, because (i) lack of motivation is the best type of evidence for com-
binatorical restrictions being conventionalized and not semantically based, and (ii) in any
case, observation/description is a separate logical step to explanation, and it is a sufficient
goal of a good reference grammar to furnish explicit descriptions, without having to explain
every phenomenon (cf. Dryer forthcoming). The second of M&H’s reasons has to do with
the provisional nature of the data they were working from, in other words, that their rules
were restricted to the corpus they were working with. But this is a general constraint on all
descriptions – all formulations of grammatical rules are limited to the corpus at hand, and
in that sense provisional – and should not therefore be used to downplay the significance of
exceptions, especially when they involve quite common and basic lexemes.
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Section 2.2). We find their arguments here quite unconvincing. Firstly, they do
not propose a semantic analysis for any Mundari lexeme. Secondly, even for the
Samoan example they discuss (lā ‘sun, be sunny, sunny’ – p. 415) they do not
attempt to state what the proposed vague meaning is, and within the schema-
tized representation of meaning components they give (in terms of unspecified
meaning components A, B, C, D, and E), there is no single element found in all
three uses.4 This certainly does not meet the normal requirements for demon-
strating the existence of a shared meaning, even on the formulation they give
themselves in connection with a true case of vague meaning such as (p. 414):
“we can find an abstract definition that covers both interpretations: male cousin
and female cousin” (e.g., one assumes, in a formulation like ‘parent’s sibling’s
child’ – NE & TO).
Secondly, they would need to show that the meaning of words used in par-
ticular syntactic contexts accrues the same semantic increment, across all lex-
emes of the class, in the same compositional way.5 This is not a requirement
they accept – see their discussion in Section 3.2.2 – but we believe theirs to be
a mistaken position, for reasons we now elaborate.
On p. 416 of their comment they remark:
in our opinion E&O’s discussion of the problem of semantic arbitrariness fails to
appreciate the difference between conceptualization and lexicalization and, as a
result they seem to treat metaphor as something different from normal language.
This criticism rests on a failure – common in the cognitive linguistics literature
– to give due weight to the difference between lexicalized (conventionalized)
and creative metaphor. Of course metaphor and other tropes are not something
different from normal language, and of course figurative speech is “an inte-
gral part of human language and categorization” (p. 416). However, once a
metaphor or other trope has become lexicalized it has created a particular se-
mantic increment that is part of the conventionalized lexicon of the language
4. A further problem is that the standard tests for vagueness vs polysemy that they cite are all set
up to deal with lexical items that occur in the same syntactic position (e.g., Duffy discovered
a mole, and so did Clark, where the tested item is an object NP in both cases). Adapting these
to deal with the case at hand, where one meaning occurs in a predication slot and another in
another argument slot, is a non-trivial task. About the closest we can come to testing this is
by using an infinitive slot, embedding the tested lexeme under a verb capable of taking both
an infinitive and a base noun, like laga ‘be tired of’ or caba ‘finish’. If we do this with a
word like jom ‘food; to eat’, in a sentence like jom=ko lagatana or jom=ko cabajana we find
that it is in fact not vague: these mean, only, ‘they are tired of/have got tired of the food’ and
‘they have finished the food’ respectively. To express the action meaning we need to use a
reduplicated form of the word at hand, which normally has an iterative meaning, e.g., jojom.
Thus: jojom=ko lagajana ‘they have got tired of eating’. It is difficult to account for this effect
if one adopts a vagueness analysis. (We thank Maki Purti for this additional data.)
5. For Croft this position is still too weak – we take this point up below.
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it occurs in, that must be listed – and defined – as a conventional and arbitrary
fact about that lexeme, in that language.
A relation of metaphorical or metonymic extension may hold in three ways:
(i) between a conventionalized meaning, part of the stable mental lexicon of
all or most members of the relevant speech community (and dictionaries
that record this knowledge), and a creative extension in context, which is
part of an “utterance meaning” but is not conventionalized.
(ii) between different senses of a word, that are combinatorically equivalent
(e.g., their example of mole); here we have a case of a lexicalized poly-
semic link. An example would be the conventionalized use of a noun to
mean ‘many’ as well as ‘mountain’. For a polysemic link (ii) to be found,
of course, it must previously have been used by some creative speaker, as
in (i), then passing from pragmatics to semantics via a process of struc-
turation, variously known in this case as grammaticalization, lexicaliza-
tion, or depragmaticization – see, e.g.. Hopper & Traugott 1993, Evans
2003.)
(iii) between signs that differ in their combinatorics as well as their meaning,
with a lexicalized relation of heterosemy (Lichtenberk 1991). This, as
we argue in Section 3.2 of our article, is the best analysis of the relation
between Mundari buru ‘n.: mountain’ and buru ‘v.t.: heap up, pile up’ or
jom ‘v.t.: eat’ and jom ‘n.: ‘food’, which have distinct combinatorics in
addition to the rather complex semantic relation between the respective
senses. In fact, the semantic relationship between the linked senses here
involves more than one step in each case, so that a better example would
be laTab ‘n.: scissors’ and laTab ‘v.t.: cut with scissors’, where there is a
straightforward metonymy of the type ‘entity’ > ‘perform characteristic
action using entity as instrument’.6
Even though there are a number of widespread crosslinguistic tendencies in
the realm of figurative speech, the tendency to confuse trends with universals
in cognitive semantics needs to be reined in and tempered with proper consid-
eration of the range of alternative figurative pathways that languages manifest
(see, for example, the arguments in Evans & Wilkins 2000 against treating as
universal certain patterns of extension from ‘see’ into the realm of cognition).
6. Once we distinguish these three situations, another of their objections to our analysis evapo-
rates, namely the issues of whether there is “a principled way to distinguish across languages
between zero conversion and polysemy” (p. 417). To qualify as zero conversion there must
be a shift in combinatorics, whereas polysemy is a relation between signs with (i) the same
signifier, (ii) semantically related signifieds, and (iii) the same combinatorics. Of course, the
issue of combinatorics is intimately tied up with the whole analysis into word classes, so there
might appear to be a danger of circularity here. But since the solution to the word class prob-
lem must satisfy multiple constraints – those we elaborate in our article – this is not a fatal
problem.
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It is an arbitrary and conventional fact about Mundari, which must be learned,
that kapi participates in the linked meanings ‘axe (i.e., an entity)’ and ‘form
into an axe, make an axe’ in Mundari while its English counterpart axe partic-
ipates in the linked meanings ‘axe (i.e., an entity)’ and ‘cut, get rid of’. To be
sure, in each case an original creative process of entity → process metonymy
gave rise to a figurative extension, in an individual utterance. But the subse-
quent processes of lexicalization then led to the selection of different meto-
nymic links in Mundari and English, each absorbed into the respective langue
or lexical system of each language. Though we agree that, in certain cases, “it
is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between literal and non-literal lan-
guage”, the cases we discuss are safely on the side of lexicalized use (which is
why they appear in dictionaries of these languages), and should not be confused
with creative tropes, which are free to be created on-line, free of pre-existing
conventions in the language.
For this reason we regard any attempt to dispense with the requirement of
regular semantic increment as a misguided confusion of the difference be-
tween pragmatics and semantics, and would not accept any analysis of word
classes in a given language as justified if it fails to measure up on this require-
ment. Since, additionally, their proposed counter-analysis does not even state
the “vague” meanings explicitly, we do not regard it as a convincing treat-
ment of the Mundari facts – nor would we regard as satisfactory an analysis
of any other language along the same lines. It follows that, on our view, their
“flexible” language type remains an underdefined construct, unless it simply
corresponds to what we call a “rampant zero conversion language” – and, in
that case, as we argue in Section 2.4, the proliferation of differing semantic in-
crements accompanying zero conversion are too diverse to make it possible to
identify precategorial lexical meanings, so that we are driven back into setting
up distinct word classes after all.
We must also address H&R’s disagreement with our characterisation of
Hoffmann’s position on word classes in the Encyclopaedia Mundarica. They
are quite correct to cite his brief statement on pages 8–9 saying he has “nothing
to add” to his earlier Introduction. However, what is striking is the exhaustive,
semantically explicit, and scrupulously accurate listing of attested uses for each
lexeme – which is of course what makes EM such a fabulous resource for the
study of widespread zero conversion. But in addition to cases where he explic-
itly states that particular uses are impossible (such as the statement about aN
‘dawn’ (EM p. 120) quoted by H&R) there are many others where he only lists
nominal or only verbal uses, such as atiri (p. 257) ‘sbst., a cover of an earthen
waterpot’ (EM p. 257) or araŏ ‘trs. to tie the special knot by means of whih the
. . . carrying net . . . is attached to the . . . carrying pole’ (EM p. 164), from which
a nominal can only be formed by infixation: a-n-araŏ ‘vrb. n., the manner of
tying this knot’. Whether he explicitly excludes a particular use, or only does
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so implicitly by not listing it, what is striking is the honesty and accuracy of
his coverage: he only puts in uses when he has attested them, and his data cor-
relates amazingly well with what we have been able to check with Maki Purti
and other Munda speakers.
It is this vast body of robust and detailed data and the labellings he uses with
it, rather than the brief statement in his introduction, which we were wanting
to contrast with his earlier claim. Moreover, we disagree with H&R that “what
he is actually describing is the meaning of a lexical item when used as the head
of a referential phrase, without committing himself to classifying the item in
question” (as a noun, verb, etc.). In fact he is conscientious about giving a
large number of examples in their phrasal or sentential context, and in any
case our reading of the passage immediately preceding the section H&R cite
(from pages 8–9 of Vol. 1 of EM) suggests he is in fact drawing much more
on the distributional criteria (of infixation and suffixation) than H&R’s quote
suggests:
The bulk of the language consists of monosyllables coalescing into the words that
make up a sentence. In this work prefixes and infixes play the main part in the
formation of the new words, whereas suffixes and, to some extent, infixes
are, in Mundari at least, the main factors determining the grammatical
functions performed by the words of a proposition. (emphasis ours – NE
& TO)
Before concluding our response to H&R, we would also like to correct a
couple of statements in their commentary that misrepresent our position.
In their Section 4.2.1 they bring in the issue of verbs that can be used directly
in complement clauses (their examples (8) and (9), = our examples (37) and
(38)). In their discussion of why we do not take these as examples favouring
a precategorial analysis they pass from a formulation that we would accept –
that “here the lexeme is not used in a prototypical function” – to one that we
would not – that “i.e., it is not used to refer to a physical object”. We take
it as accepted practice in the analysis of word classes that the meanings of
words under classification should not be taken into account in the initial stage
of establishing word classes, and should only be brought in at the stage of
deciding what to name the classes (cf. Evans 2000a: 709–710), and at no stage
in our analysis does the denotation of a word play a role in determining what
class it belongs to.7 We do, however (Section 3.1), require that the words we are
interested in should show distributional equivalence in canonical constructional
contexts, so that it is not enough for words to be distributionally equivalent in
7. Apart, of course, from the issue of requiring regular semantic contributions by constructional
context across all members of a putative class, but this concerns relations between denotations
in grammatical contexts, not the denotations themselves.
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grammatical contexts which we know from crosslinguistic work (e.g. Hopper
& Thompson 1984) tend to blur the combinatoric profiles of nouns and verbs.
The contexts at issue here – complements of phasal predicates like ‘finish’ or
psych-predicates like ‘be tired of’ – are of this type, and it is for this reason that
we do not regard these contexts as establishing a lack of distinction between
nouns and verbs in Mundari.
A final, minor point regarding H&R’s suggestion (Section 5.3.2) that the
Mundari plural marker -ko should be analysed as a clitic 3rd person plural
pronoun. While there is undoubtedly an etymological relationship between the
nominal plural suffix -ko and the 3rd person clitic pronoun =ko, we need to
distinguish the two analytically: the first attaches at the right edge of NPs,
while the second attaches at the right edge of the constituent preceding the
predicate or, if no such constituent is present, to the right edge of the predicate
itself (see our example (24b)).8 The distinctness of the two is shown by the
fact that they can co-occur one after the other, as in our example (24a). And
the absence of examples in which the nominal plural marker – as opposed to
the subject pronominal clitic – attaches to a non-noun, casts doubt on H&R’s
suggestion that Mundari is a “transnumeral” language.9
Though we have taken issue with the notion of a “flexible” language as a co-
herent construct in the typology of word class systems with little or no distinc-
tion between nouns and verbs, we want to emphasise that this in no way denies
the typological interests of the sorts of phenomenon H&R focus on through this
term. H&R are right to point out that is an interesting crosslinguistic parameter
how far languages permit, or discourage, zero conversion. How far this inter-
acts with other typological features, what proportion of the lexicon it affects,
and what sorts of generalizations we can detect in the interaction of base lexical
8. Incidentally, H&R are not accurate in characterizing -ko as restricted to animate entities:
inanimate examples are lijaq-ko ‘cloths’ and parkom-ko ‘beds’.
9. Consider the adjective salangi ‘tall’. It is impossible to follow this directly with the plural
marker -ko: *salangi-ko=ko kamitana is not an acceptable way to say ‘the tall ones are work-
ing’, and one needs to add a head noun like hoRo ‘man’ to make this acceptable: salangi
hoRo-ko=ko kamitana. Adjectives may in fact be substantivized by zero conversion, but take
an abstract meaning: salang ‘adj. tall; n. tallness’ etc.
The only basically adjectival word, marang, which can be followed directly by plural mark-
ing -ko is marang ‘big’, but this is a very special use, with the particular meaning ‘older
brothers/sisters’. Thus it is possible to say marang-ko=ko kami-ta-n-a, adding -ko to marang,
which is basically an adjective meaning ‘big’. However, the meaning of this sentence is more
specific: ‘elder brothers/elder sisters are working’, and not simply ‘the big ones are working’.
Because of this specific semantics we would argue that this is a particular case of a deadjec-
tival nominal, rather than of the addition of -ko to an adjective.
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meaning with added meaning are all interesting questions worthy of detailed
research.
4. Croft
Unlike H&R, Croft accepts our arguments that Mundari does have word classes.
His disagreements with us run in other directions, and we will focus below on
four main points. We do not address his criticism that we have not come up
with a rigorous theory of universals, with regards to parts of speech: this was
never our goal, which was the more modest one of setting up agreed rules of
argumentation that need to be satisfied before the analyst can claim to have
established a lack of differentiation between major word classes.
The four critical points we will address below are the following:
(i) that in our principles (i) and (iii) we are simply applying the distribu-
tional approach developed by the American structuralist tradition and its
generativist successors, with all of its drawbacks;
(ii) that we do not give any principled account of how to weight particu-
lar distributional criteria, or of how to distinguish between higher-level
classes (e.g., verb) and subclasses (e.g., transitive verb);
(iii) that we have not shown how the word classes which we have established
can be labelled “noun” and “verb” in a way that enables comparisons
across languages – which leads into fundamental questions about the
crosslinguistic comparability or otherwise of the categories established
on intra-linguistic grounds, and about whether it is in fact possible or ap-
propriate to generalize about large-scale classes rather than associating
each individual lexeme with its own distinct combinatoric profile;
(iv) that the semantic contributions we permit constructional contexts to make
are too permissively characterised.
(i) Relationship of our principles to distributionalist approaches. Certainly,
our arguments are neo-classical in the sense that we wish to retain the strengths
of the structuralist tradition. Chief among them is the use of distributional ev-
idence to establish word classes in a way that avoids “notional definitions”
which second-guess the question of which meanings are associated with which
classes, by assigning words to classes on the basis of their meaning rather than
their combinatorics, or on the basis of what class they belong to in some ref-
erence language (Latin, English etc.). The wish to preserve this advantage lies
behind our requirement of distributional equivalence (Section 3.1), including
the requirement of bidirectionality (Section 3.3).
However, the form of distributionalism pioneered by the American struc-
turalist tradition had a serious flaw: It considered the study of meaning un-
scientific and generally avoided the use of semantic criteria. The principle of
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compositionality that we formulate in Section 3.2, including the corollary of
compositional consistency, makes crucial reference to meaning.10 This is not a
feature of the American structuralist tradition, but grows out of the more con-
fident approach that linguists now take to meaning, regardless of whether they
come from a formal semantic background (and the principle of compositional-
ity has its source in the “rule-for-rule” hypothesis of Montague semantics) or
from a background in cognitive semantics, with its interest in lexical polysemy.
Bringing semantics into our heuristics in this way has two main advantages:
it avoids certain types of undue proliferation in distributional profiles, and it
assists in the crosslinguistic matching of word classes set up for each language
on language-individual grounds. We consider the first advantage here, returning
to the second below.
As Croft points out, Bloomfield (1933: 269) and Harris (1946: 177, 1951:
244) were concerned that, if applied rigorously, the distributional method would
end up splitting a language’s lexicon into a myriad of tiny classes, asymptoti-
cally one class per lexeme.11 Introducing semantics into our heuristics allows
to shave off a major cause of apparent distributional chaos, which results from
the differential effects of polysemy on the distribution of words.12
Compare the distributions of seed and petal in English. If we cannot re-
fer to meaning, we cannot distinguish the signifiers seed1 ‘flowering plant’s
unit of reproduction or germ capable of developing into another such plant’
and seed2 ‘remove seed1s from (fruit)’. As a consequence, we get an apparent
distributional difference between petal and seed: the former combines with
10. Note in passing that this is not going back on the decision not to employ notional definitions,
since we are talking here about the relations between meanings in different constructions,
rather than using word-meanings to assign words to classes directly.
11. In his discussion of Bloomfield and Harris in Section 3, Croft also mentions Gross (1979) as
giving “an empirical demonstration of this fact” (i.e., of each word belonging to its own word
class). This is a misrepresentation of Gross’s position. Gross happily employs the categories
of noun and verb, but his argument is directed towards establishing that different French verbs
pattern distinctly in terms of their profile of combination with a range of complement types.
In other words, he accepts the validity of noun and verb as major word class categories (to
which one can, for example, apply the usual tests in terms of the combinability of nouns
with articles, and plural suffixes, and of verbs with auxiliaries, and inflectionally encoded
person/number/tense/aspect categories), but wishes to argue for the subcategorization of verbs
into distinct subclasses when it comes to the more subtle distributional facts that one discovers
once one looks at patterns of complementation.
12. We deliberately use ‘words’ loosely here for lexical stems that may prima facie be linked,
since this is the point of departure for the sorts of analysis we are considering. Exactly how
many lexemes one ends up identifying depends on one’s lexicological assumptions about
how to deal with heterosemy and polysemy; in our seed/petal example we use small capitals
for what might be grouped together by initial hypothesis (treating meaning in the grossest
possible way), and italicized words with numerical subscripts for the sort of final groupings
established after separating distinct lexemes in a relation of heterosemy.
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articles and the plural suffix -s, but not with auxiliaries or the continuous suffix
-ing, while the latter combines with both. But once we admit semantics to our
treatment, we split seed into (at least) two signs, in a relation of heterosemy to
one another, and seed1 and petal are now seen as distributionally equivalent,
since seed1, like petal, cannot combine with auxiliaries of the continuous suffix
-ing. The apparent distributional difference was due to us lumping two signs
together into one.
(ii) Weighting of distributional criteria; subclasses. On Croft’s view, the ap-
plication of distributional criteria would lead to a fragmentation into tiny
classes – “The result of this is that one does not end up with large word classes,
as E&O want. Languages simply do not behave this way” (Section 3) – unless
the analyst resorts to “methodological opportunism” by arbitrarily elevating a
canonical subset of distributional facts. He criticizes us for falling prey to this
malpractice in our analysis of Mundari.
Both sides of this claim strike us as very odd, running against the results
of grammatical and lexicographic descriptions carried out for hundreds if not
thousands of the world’s languages, from English to Russian to Japanese to
Kayardild. These descriptions do not simply “grab a construction here, a gram-
matical inflection there”. Although the exact criteria they use differ from lan-
guage to language, the distributional tests are not a random grab-bag. A rather
restricted set of morphological and syntactic criteria recur in language after lan-
guage (see, e.g., Schachter 1985), even if the exact set instantiated in a given
language varies, and we sometimes stumble on exotica.
We also have an ever-clearer idea of which distributional facts predict which
others – no-one disputes that incorporation contexts, for example, are a less ac-
curate way of finding out what categories a noun inflects for, than occurrence
as the head of a free NP. In other words, some properties of members of a par-
ticular class turn out to be excellent predictors of other properties, so that one
can set up chains of dependencies between properties, rather than there sim-
ply being a rag-bag collection of randomly intersecting characteristics. These
chains of dependencies can then be compared meaningfully across languages
(cf. Plank 1984).
Moreover, the tests correlate clearly with Croft’s typology of “propositional
acts”, which is why, in so many languages, definiteness turns out to be a good
criterion for nouns, tense and aspect turns out to be a good criterion for verbs,
and why comparatives turn out to be a good criterion for adjectives.13 Croft
13. Of course, neo-structuralist procedures are flexible enough to handle “unexpected” correla-
tions – tense on nouns in Kayardild or Guaraní, or object definiteness on verbs in Hungarian.
Our point is that the weighting of some criteria over others is not arbitrary, but motivated by
their links to basic clause functions.
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has, himself, written persuasively of the rationale for many of these effects, and
in so doing has made explicit some of the typological reasons why particular
criteria work the way they do. But the judicious privileging of some criteria
over others is something with a long history in both descriptive linguistics and
typology, and dismissing it as mere “methodological opportunism” overlooks
the many perfectly defensible reasons – admittedly not always made explicit –
for the choices that are made.
The other part of Croft’s criticism concerns the rationale for setting up a
nested hierarchy of classes and subclasses, which may also allow for multi-
ple combinations of dimensions, e.g., transitivity of verbs on the one hand,
and their aspectual properties on another. Here too, we would argue, standard
descriptive practice proceeds from a fundamental and defensible assumption.
This is the logical ordering of distributional properties from general to partic-
ular, which is used to set up a hierarchy such that subclasses inherit distribu-
tional generalizations from superclasses, adding in further distributional crite-
ria of their own. In both Russian and Kayardild, for example, “inflectability for
case” establishes a superclass (sometimes called nominals) containing nouns,
pronouns, demonstratives, and adjectives; nouns then inherit this property but
introduce further properties of their own.
Likewise verbs in all four languages have their own profile of inflectional
possibilities, but subdivide into transitive vs intransitive (inter alia), dynamic
vs. stative in Japanese, and so forth. Again subclasses inherit the distributional
characteristics of verbs as a whole, but add additional specifications charac-
teristic of their subclass (e.g., particular limitations on which inflections are
possible with adjectival verbs in Japanese). Certainly some words end up with
a unique or highly distinctive distributional profile – wuuja ‘give’ is the only
Kayardild verb allowing five distinct case frames (Evans 1995: 334), just as
rent is the one of very few English verbs that is self-converse, allowing for the
rearrangement of prepositions: Bill rented his bike from Kees ↔ Kees rented
his bike to Bill. But this does not stop them behaving, at the level of higher-
level generalizations such as their combination with inflectional suffixes or (in
English) auxiliaries, exactly like the thousands of other members of their major
word class.
For these reasons, we see the prospect Croft holds up – of a mapping of
distributional properties that “does not produce a large-scale, exclusive parti-
tioning of the items that fill the roles” and for which there is instead “a com-
plex, many-to-many mapping between constructions and elements” (Section 3)
– as a programmatic chimera. While we would not rule out the possibility that
a language whose grammar looks like this exists, we are not familiar with a
well-worked out description of any language – in the form of a grammar plus
lexicon – which employs this sort of treatment, or which shows why it is nec-
essary.
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(iii) Equivalence of noun, verb, etc. across languages. To begin with, we
point out that it was not the purpose of our paper to set out criteria for how
major word classes should be matched up across languages. Rather, it was
to make explicit the argumentative steps that need to be gone through be-
fore establishing that no distinction between major word classes exists. Fail-
ure to satisfy these steps merely results in the positing of two (or more) major
word classes; what they should then be called is a separate and complex is-
sue.
Nonetheless, we believe that once we readmit semantics to our heuristics
– and again this is in no way an original claim, having been made by many
scholars before us – we get a lever for setting up cross-linguistic equivalences
of (some) word classes, something that could not be done under classic struc-
turalist methods. In our view – and we are in fact largely drawing on the
same assumptions as Croft here – there are three types of procedure for do-
ing this: prototypical denotations, propositional acts, and conversion
effects. Between them, they allow us to address Croft’s questioning of the
validity of us naming the classes we have set up in Mundari as “nouns” and
“verbs”.
The first procedure, pioneered by Dixon (1977) in his study of adjectives,
developed by Croft himself in a number of publications (e.g., Croft 1991),
and implicitly accepted in our article here, is to line up the distributionally-
established classes from each language on the basis of what their prototypical
denotations are. Here the assumption is that while the boundaries of the cate-
gory may vary (‘intelligent’ may or may not be encoded as an adjective), the
meaning of core members is crosslinguistically stable. If a language has an ad-
jective class, it will include ‘big’ and ‘good’ as meanings, and conversely an
established class with ‘big’ and ‘good’ as core members can safely be labelled
“adjective” whether or not it includes a word meaning ‘intelligent’. Though
Croft, in his discussion of our article, links these “prototypically correlated
lexical semantic classes” to “propositional acts” rather than to distributional
classes, in fact we can typically argue for a three-way linkage between word
classes, propositional acts, and ontological types (e.g., nouns <> reference <>
objects) as argued in Croft (1991). It is on the basis of these considerations that
we give the labels “noun” and “verb” to the categories we set up in our analysis
of Mundari.
The second procedure, which has become such common practice among ty-
pologists (including both Hengeveld and Croft) that it is difficult to associate it
with any particular investigator, is the use of what Croft labels “propositional
act” functions: reference, predication, and modification. Marrying this
with analyses that permit us to identify marked and unmarked uses of lexemes
then gives us a principled basis for regarding some distributional facts as more
fundamental than others, a point we return to below.
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The third procedure, developed by Croft, builds not on the basic denotations
of words, but on the semantic and grammatical effects that constructional co-
ercion produces on them, as outlined in his (1).
In each case, combining semantics with distributional arguments gives us
a firm basis for identifying word classes across languages. It is for this reason
that we see it as helpful to produce a set of criteria that draws on the classic dis-
tributional methods of the structuralists, but augments them with formulations
that draw on semantics where appropriate.
(iv) Directionality of semantic shifts. Although Croft agrees with our criti-
cism of approaches that allow idiosyncratic semantic shifts, he takes us to task
for not tightening up our criterion (ii) to rule out particular directionalities to
any regular shifts that take place as lexemes occur in particular constructional
contexts. In particular, he claims that while our criterion allows for languages
“in which a predicated action word means ‘do Verb’ and the same word in a
referring expression means ‘one that Verbs”’ – a pattern attested in a number
of languages – it also allows for languages “in which a predicated action word
means ‘be one that Verbs’ and the same word in a referring expression means
‘the act of Verbing”’ – an unattested pattern. He goes on to give plausible ty-
pological reasons why this pattern should never be found.
Is the failure to tighten up our formulation so as to rule this out a mistake? We
do not believe it is. The goal of our paper was not to test universal claims, but to
formulate rules for the description of individual languages, which can
then be fed into the crosslinguistic data base over which universals are tested.
If the principles used in constructing individual descriptions would prevent us
from recognizing such a language, then the lack of its attestation has no typo-
logical significance: it merely follows (quasi analytically) from our descriptive
procedure. On the other hand, if the rules of argumentation do not themselves
exclude that one could produce such a description, but nonetheless no such
grammars are found, then we have a significant typological fact in need of ex-
planation. For this reason we would not wish to revise our formulation, and in
fact see it as an advantage that it permits the sort of grammar whose lack of
attestation Croft notes.
To complete this part of our response to Croft we would like to underline
our endorsement of the final challenge he lays down to investigate the word
classes of Mundari in more detail than we could here. A rigorous statement of
constructional meaning for the various constructions we have discussed, and a
categorization of an appropriately large number of lexemes for their behaviour
and meaning in each of these constructions, and more – rather than just a judg-
ment of acceptability and meaning as “noun” or “verb” as we have done here
– would be a huge advance on the analysis we have presented, though it is no
small task.
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5. Conclusion
Linguistics still has a long way to go before we can claim to have a generally
applicable set of analytic practices that on the one hand are rigorous enough
that evaluating them is not just a matter of personal taste, or of adherence to
a particular theoretical school or areal tradition, and on the other are supple
enough to capture the full range of diversity found in the world’s languages.
Typologists need convergent rules of argumentation at least as much as any
other sort of linguist, since otherwise they will never be sure whether the dif-
ferences in the descriptions of languages they are comparing reflect true dif-
ferences between the languages themselves, or mere differences in analytical
assumptions on the part of their grammarians.
Recent years have seen considerable convergence in descriptive and ana-
lytic practices, including steps towards a standardized glossing system (since
Lehmann 1982) and a unified ontology that must underly it. We have made less
progress in standardizing the practices of argumentation,14 yet until we make
these explicit we will be left with a situation where what counts as evidence
for one linguist will be deemed irrelevant by another. This leaves our field
roughly where microbiology was before Koch’s postulates laid down guide-
lines for how a researcher demonstrates that infection by a microbe causes
disease.
Because the assumptions that underly argumentation are so numerous, and
interact in so many ways, developing a set of convergent rules of argumentation
is a huge task for the field. The very different responses of our distinguished
commentators show how far we still are from having an agreed set of rules of
argumentation within word class typology. Croft accepts our arguments that
Mundari does not have just a single major word class, while Hengeveld and
Rijkhoff reject them; Croft takes us to task for being too permissive in the
semantic shifts we allow lexemes to accrue within constructions (e.g., interac-
tions with aspect) while Hengeveld and Rijkhoff reject the constraints that we
require. As so often in linguistics, whether an analysis is considered convincing
depends on the assumptions one brings to its evaluation, and we will not have
generally acceptable principles of argumentation until we have agreement on
what those assumptions are. We hope that the principles we have outlined, both
14. There have, of course, been periods in linguistics where the need for these has been discussed
particularly overtly – the American Structuralist period, for example, and the early phase of
generative grammar (as exemplified by the focus on argumentation in Soames & Perlmutter’s
(1979) textbook). A renewed interest in generalized rules of argumentation has much to draw
on, thanks to this prior work. However, it must now take into account a number of other
crucial developments in the field, in particular the integration of semantics, the distribution of
domains of interest across different schools (e.g., polysemy and figures of speech to so-called
cognitive linguistics), and our vastly increased knowledge of the world’s languages.
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in the original article and in this response to the thoughtful critiques proposed
by our commentators, will help to clarify this process.
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